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O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Michael Bankoff appeals from the District Court’s October 28, 2011, amended 
judgment of conviction and sentence entered following our July 27, 2010, order disposing 
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of the parties’ cross-appeals from the initial judgment and remanding for further 
proceedings.  For the following reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and 
the sentence entered by the District Court.   
I. Background 
 We briefly summarize the relevant facts, which we previously set forth in detail in 
our opinion addressing the first appeal, United States v. Bankoff, 613 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 
2010).   
In 1999, Bankoff began receiving Social Security disability benefits.  The Social 
Security Administration (SSA) subsequently informed him that he was required to repay 
a $9,000 overpayment.  Bankoff sought a waiver of the overpayment, which was denied 
by SSA claims adjuster Daniel Sphabmixy.  In February 2007, Bankoff called Sphabmixy 
to complain about the denial and also left threatening phone messages for Sphabmixy, 
who alerted his supervisor, Susan Tonik.  Bankoff then called Tonik to apologize and 
scheduled a meeting for March 9, 2007.  On the morning of March 9, however, Bankoff 
cancelled the meeting and left two threatening voicemails for Tonik, shouting “somebody 
ought to spit in that bitch’s face, she doesn’t know how to talk to people . . . I will smack 
the shit out of that bitch.”  Tonik became “very worried and very scared.”  That same 
day, Bankoff also spoke with SSA claims representative Crystal Robinson, complaining 
about Tonik and telling Robinson that he would come to the office, take the gun away 
from “the pig up front,” and “slap every woman in the place.”   
In April 2007, a grand jury returned a three-count Indictment charging Bankoff 
with threatening employees of the SSA, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115.  Section 
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115(a)(1)(B) provides, in relevant part: 
Whoever . . . threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States official, a 
United States judge, a Federal law enforcement officer, or an official whose killing 
would be a crime under [18 U.S.C. § 1114], with intent to impede, intimidate, or 
interfere with such official, judge, or law enforcement officer while engaged in the 
performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such official, 
judge, or law enforcement officer on account of the performance of official duties, 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 
 
18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).  
Throughout the proceedings, numerous psychiatric evaluations and hearings were 
held to determine whether Bankoff was competent to stand trial and whether he should be 
allowed to represent himself.  At a pretrial hearing on March 17, 2008, the District Court 
found Bankoff competent to stand trial and able to represent himself.  Although Bankoff 
had repeatedly requested to proceed pro se, he changed his mind before and during trial, 
which resulted in him being represented by counsel at times and at other times 
representing himself with counsel on standby.   
The jury found Bankoff guilty of threatening Tonik (Count Two) and Robinson 
(Count Three) but acquitted him of threatening Sphabmixy (Count One).  The District 
Court granted Bankoff’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count Three, finding that 
Robinson was not an “official” within the meaning of the statute.  The District Court 
varied upward from the applicable Guidelines range and sentenced Bankoff to 60 
months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release.   
The parties cross-appealed.  We analyzed the proper interpretation of “official,” 
concluded that the District Court erred in granting a judgment of acquittal as to Robinson, 
and vacated the District Court’s judgment on Count Three.  We affirmed the denial of a 
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judgment of acquittal as to Tonik on Count Two, rejected Bankoff’s Sixth Amendment 
claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings.   
On remand, the District Court denied Bankoff’s motion to revisit his competency 
to stand trial, noting that the issue was beyond the scope of remand because it had not 
been raised on appeal.  At the resentencing hearing on October 27, 2011, after argument 
and a lengthy colloquy, the District Court found that Bankoff was competent to proceed 
to resentencing.  Though counsel was present, Bankoff insisted on representing himself 
and was permitted to present his arguments.  The District Court found the evidence 
sufficient to sustain a conviction on Count Three, rejected Bankoff’s challenge to a three-
level enhancement based on the victims’ official status, and considered the 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) factors.  The District Court noted that Bankoff’s Guidelines range was higher 
than at the original sentencing but failed to calculate the revised range on the record.  The 
District Court announced its intention to impose the same sentence despite the revised 
range and ultimately imposed the same 60-month sentence of imprisonment, to be 
followed by three years of supervised release, to run concurrently on Counts Two and 
Three.   
 Bankoff appealed.   
II. Discussion 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo 
whether the District Court properly interpreted and applied our mandate.  See Kilbarr 
Corp. v. Bus. Sys. Inc., 990 F.2d 83, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1993).  We address in turn each of the 
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five issues Bankoff, proceeding pro se, raises on appeal.       
A. Competency at Trial 
 Bankoff argues that the District Court erred by refusing on remand to revisit the 
issue of his competency to stand trial.  In his first appeal, Bankoff did not challenge the 
District Court’s finding that he was competent to stand trial.  Because the issue could and 
should have been raised in his first appeal, Bankoff failed to preserve the issue for 
review.  See United States v. Pultrone, 241 F.3d 306, 307-08 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining failure to identify 
or argue an issue in opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal).  Moreover, 
the issue of Bankoff’s competency was not within the scope of remand, which was 
limited to consideration of the outstanding sufficiency challenge to Count Three and 
resentencing.  We are thus without jurisdiction to review the argument now.  See 
Pultrone, 241 F.3d at 308.   
 B. Competency at Resentencing 
 Bankoff further argues that the District Court erred by finding him competent to 
proceed to resentencing.
1
  We review the District Court’s ruling on the necessity of a 
competency hearing de novo and its factual findings regarding competency for clear 
error.  United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 1998).  A criminal defendant 
shall be subjected to a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that 
                                                 
1  Bankoff also claims that the District Court erred by allowing him to represent 
himself at resentencing when he had not requested to do so.  That claim is clearly belied 
by the record, which shows that Bankoff repeatedly asked to represent himself, and thus 
we decline to address it.   
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the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him 
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”  18 
U.S.C. § 4241(a).  In this fact-intensive inquiry, the District Court considers a number of 
factors, including “evidence of a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, 
and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.”  Leggett, 162 F.3d at 242.   
 It is clear from the record that the District Court did not err in determining that 
Bankoff was competent to proceed with resentencing.  The District Court was already 
familiar with the numerous materials presented at the prior competency hearing, during 
which it found Bankoff competent to stand trial.  In preparation for the hearing on 
October 27, 2011, the District Court reviewed recent psychological reports prepared by 
the Bureau of Prisons staff, which stated that Bankoff’s current mental status and 
behavior did not suggest significant mental health problems.  During the hearing, the 
District Court conducted a lengthy colloquy with Bankoff, who correctly and intelligently 
answered questions about the proceedings, presented coherent and logical arguments 
regarding his motion for judgment of acquittal and in favor of a more lenient sentence, 
and corrected the District Court when it mistakenly identified the prosecutor at trial as the 
defense counsel.  The District Court thus properly concluded that Bankoff was “very 






 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 Bankoff contends that no reasonable jury could find him guilty on Count Three.
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For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the government and must sustain a jury’s verdict if a reasonable jury believing the 
government’s evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved 
all the elements of the offenses.”  United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 
1997) (internal quotations omitted).  This places “a very heavy burden” on appellant.  Id.   
 In support of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, Bankoff argued before the 
District Court that the evidence was insufficient to establish that his conduct constituted a 
“true” threat against Robinson or that he acted with the requisite intent.  Based on the 
record, we conclude that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Bankoff’s statements constituted a threat to Robinson and that Bankoff acted with the 
intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with Robinson with respect to the performance 
of her official duties.  We thus affirm the District Court’s denial of the motion for 
judgment of acquittal on Count Three.       
 D. Resentencing 
 Bankoff contends—and the government concedes—that the District Court 
procedurally erred by failing to determine his revised Guidelines range at the 
                                                 
2
  Bankoff also argues that the evidence is insufficient as to Count Two because 
exculpatory evidence shows he is innocent.  Bankoff previously challenged the District 
Court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Two solely on the basis 
of the interpretation of “official” within the meaning of the statute, and we affirmed his 
conviction on that count.  Bankoff, 613 F.3d at 372.  To the extent that Bankoff now 
attempts to raise a different insufficiency argument, he has waived it.  See Pultrone, 241 
F.3d at 308.     
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resentencing hearing.  We agree.  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) 
(listing the failure to calculate the Guidelines range as a significant procedural error).  
This type of error typically requires reversal but, under limited circumstances, can be 
harmless.  United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 2008).  “For the error to 
be harmless, it must be clear that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of 
the sentence imposed.”  Id. (citing Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)).  
“[T]he record must be unambiguous that the miscalculation of the range had no effect and 
that the sentencing judge would have imposed the same sentence under a correct 
Guideline range.”  United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 569 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 Remand is unnecessary here because the District Court’s error was harmless.  
While Bankoff’s applicable Guidelines range rose to 51 to 63 months, from 41 to 51 
months, it is clear from the record that the District Court never intended to impose a 
higher penalty than the 60 months originally imposed.  Because Bankoff would have 
received the same sentence even if the District Court had calculated the new Guidelines 
range, this error was harmless.  We thus affirm the sentence imposed by the District 
Court. 
 E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 Ineffective assistance of counsel claims should ordinarily be raised in a collateral 
proceeding rather than on direct appeal.  See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 
504-05 (2003); United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2003) (deferring 
such claims to a collateral attack unless the record on direct appeal is sufficient to allow 
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determination of the issue).  Because the record before us is insufficient, we decline to 
address Bankoff’s allegations.  Any claim that Bankoff may have based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel must be raised under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.    
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and the 
sentence entered by the District Court. 
